# 1NC

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#### Security is a psychological construct---the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other---this is a gate-way issue---if they win their impacts are real we won’t cross-apply to prove links

**Mack ‘91**

Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to **participate in acts of violence** they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

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#### Economic engagement works with state institutions – the plan is civil society engagement

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Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

#### Violation – aff does non-governmental engagement – visas aren’t bi-directional

#### Vote negative to preserve predictable limits – allowing non-governmental engagements ensures thousands of random private actors get brought into the topic – explodes negative research burden

## off

#### Obama’s pressure is preventing a vote on Iran sanctions

AL-Monitor 3/13 (Pulse of the Middle East, 3/13/14, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/congress-russia-ukrain.html>, JS)

A number of hawkish members argue that Republicans should latch on to every legislative vehicle that hits the floor to force Democrats to publicly debate and vote on the sanctions measure. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., is preventing a vote on the stand-alone bill, infuriating Republicans.¶ Others, however, are urging a quick vote on a $1 billion line of credit to Ukraine to help the fledgling interim government stave off fiscal calamity. They say helping Ukraine stand up to Russia should be the top priority.¶ “I would do anything we can do to get Iran sanctions, so I would say almost every vehicle that’s out there should include that,” Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services panel, told Al-Monitor. “I think it’s a good idea. The discussion [among Republicans] is going on right now.”¶ Others agree — in theory.¶ “I’ve tried to attach sanctions to every bill; yes, it does make sense,” said Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, the No. 2 Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations panel.¶ Still, he worried about the possibility of derailing aid to Ukraine by forcing an unrelated issue.¶ “I don’t know how bad it’s going to throw a wrench in the works,” he said. “I’m not ready to see yea, nay or where we are.”¶ Some of the most hawkish Republicans are the most adamant it’s a terrible idea.¶ “I want to get it done,” said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the second-most senior Republican on the Armed Services panel. “If somebody has IMF, Iran sanctions or anything else as a higher priority, then they’ve got their priorities badly skewed.”¶ Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who has taken the lead in pushing for a vote, agreed. “I don’t want to give anybody a reason not to support the Ukraine … bill,” he said.¶ Graham said he wants a vote quickly in part to protest Crimea’s March 16 referendum to leave Ukraine and join with Russia, which he called a “sham election.”¶ “

#### Plan sparks debate and alienates labor

Herbert 10 (David. The National Journal, "Cap-And-Trade For Immigrants?" 29 May, JS)

Temporary and skilled-worker visas remain in the crosshairs. Sens. Richard Durbin, D-Ill., Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, and Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., and Reps. Zoe Lofgren and George Miller, both D-Calif., have introduced four separate bills in this Congress that would make it tougher for employers to hire foreign workers. Lofgren chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law. Other Western countries, meanwhile, are flinging open their doors to high-end workers who can't score U.S. visas or are too daunted by the process. Australia and Britain both operate point systems that let foreigners immigrate if they have the right combination of education, earning power, and youth -- a U.S. citizen with an M.B.A. or a bachelor's degree plus a salary last year of at least $70,000, for example, automatically qualifies. Canada has a half-dozen different doors through which skilled workers can enter the country. It's also a question of priorities. Just 6 percent of the U.S. visas issued in 2006 were for workers, compared with 22 percent in Canada, 41 percent in Australia, and 53 percent in Britain, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Seventy percent of the U.S. visas awarded that year, meanwhile, were for family members of citizens and legal residents. "There's been a lot of focus on low-skilled labor, but there is a desperate need for reform in the skilled-worker category," Rep. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., said. "I keep hearing from high-tech firms that they're having to follow the talent wherever it goes." Two bills are trying to alleviate the problem. Last year, Flake introduced the STAPLE Act, which would exempt foreign-born individuals who have earned doctorates in science, technology, math, or engineering from the limits on the number of employment-based green cards and H1-B visas awarded annually. Current law exempts 20,000 so-called STEM graduates from the annual allotment of 65,000 H1-B visas. Venture capital is on the minds of Sens. John Kerry, D-Mass., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind. The pair introduced the Startup Visa Act in February, which would create a two-year visa for immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to raise a minimum of $250,000, with $100,000 coming from a U.S. investor. The existing EB-5 visa is similar, but it requires fledgling entrepreneurs to invest at least $1 million and employ 10 people. Still, those are Band-Aid solutions. Big Business and labor unions say they want a comprehensive immigration policy. But the chances that Congress will tackle reform -- especially an ambitious auction or fee proposal -- grow slimmer by the day.

#### Causes Israel strikes

Jon Perr 12/24/13**,** B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002).(Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.

¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

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#### The legal system is the wrong starting point---their focus on using the law to approve Visas ignores the everyday social injustice that marginalized immigrants experience---the process of the 1AC ignores exclusion immigrants face in adjudication

Gilbert 5 (Lauren, Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1988; B.A., Harvard University, 1983., FIELDS OF HOPE, FIELDS OF DESPAIR: LEGISPRUDENTIAL AND HISTORIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE AGJOBS BILL OF 2003, lexis, Summer 2005)

Critical legal studies scholars question the underlying legitimacy of law and the lawmaking process. While process theorists would argue that laws are enacted pursuant to an informed, deliberative, and efficient process, critical legal studies scholars would contend that the lawmaking process is subjective, arational, and political. n407 In stark juxtaposition to the process theorists, critical legal theorists argue that all laws cannot be neutral because neutral laws cannot resolve the conflicts among different societal interests. Furthermore, once one acknowledges that the law is not neutral, then one must accept that each law subordinates the interests of one group in society to those of another. Critical legal scholars suggest that the "rule of law" obscures the domination of society by elite interests. n408 It also obscures the central tension within our constitutional system, which is founded [\*472] on the conflicting premises of respecting majority rule and protecting minority rights. n409 Critical legal theory thus offers a valuable critical perspective on other legisprudential theories, particularly process theories and traditional pluralism. Nonetheless, it fails to offer an adequate explanation for why progressive social reforms are enacted. If law truly is dominated by the societal elite, then how is the enactment of progressive social reforms over the last fifty years explained? As noted above, Dorothy Brown made this same point in her critique of public choice theory, arguing that Olson's theory of the free-rider effect failed to explain why public interest organizations have had such an impact on the political process over the last forty years. n410 Edward Rubin proposes a new model, the "microanalysis of institutions," which attempts to integrate institutionalist theories of lawmaking with outsider scholarship to "develop a unified scholarly discourse" on institutional behavior. n411 He defines "outsider scholarship" as a post-critical legal studies approach that uses critical race theory, feminist theory and queer theory to achieve social justice for marginalized and disempowered groups. n412 He argues that "racial minorities, women, and gay men and lesbians cannot afford the luxury of critical legal studies' fatalism; the legal system is too well entrenched to be dismissed." n413 Rather, he suggests that a deeper understanding of these structures, based on the microanalysis of institutions, can provide the basis for legal reform. Rubin suggests that a critical legal studies approach shares much in common with public choice theory. Both theories "depict institutions as either purposefully or instinctively supporting existing power structures." n414 While public choice theory would regard public institutions as rational in carrying out their strategic goals, outsider scholarship "seeks mechanisms for sensitizing these institutions to the demands of social justice." n415 Rubin's article calls for a synthesis of the various schools of legal scholarship, including the legal process school, public choice theory and critical legal studies. His proposed methodology is based on the microanalysis of institutions and a substantive focus on the interplay between efficiency and social justice considerations in the law making process. n416 [\*473] Focusing on social justice considerations for immigrants, which is particularly relevant for this Article, Kevin Johnson addresses their relative political powerlessness and the obstacles immigrant groups face in advocating for immigration reform. n417 In particular, he notes that even when non-citizens enjoy support from a majority of the electorate, they often still lose in the political and legal process because of inherent dysfunctions in lawmaking and adjudication. n418 Nonetheless, Johnson, like Brown and Rubin, recognizes that immigrant groups often enjoy the support of the advocacy community even though they are unable to participate in the electoral process. n419

#### Social justice comes first in debate---ethical obligation to reject oppressive knowledge production

Nieutvenhuis 10

Prof Jan Nieutvenhuis, Dept of Education Management and Policy Studies, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria, Acta Academica 2011: 43(1) – available at: <http://up-za.academia.edu/JanNieuwenhuis/Papers/882363/Social_justice_in_education_today>

Accept the geo-historical context of the struggle as something that must be reconciled with attempts to create social justice. This implies that the state must work with communities to repair damaged solidarities by reconciling autonomy and interdependence (Giddens 1991)- This also implies the abolishment of structural forms of oppression that restrict peoples' access to resources and opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities or capabilities for living a decent human life (Young 2002). In doing so care must be taken not to create new forms of exclusion that will, in turn, create new forms of social injustice. Similarly, it must ensure fairness in terms of rewards. One cannot reward state officials with considerable bonuses when they are failing to deliver the social services intended to create a just society. Justice is done when each member of an organisation receives a reward equivalent to the contribution s/he makes (Rawls 1971, Miller 1999). This also applies to education. One cannot reward a child if no contribution was forthcoming. For example, One cannot promote a child to the next grade automatically if s/he did not participate in the educational process on an equal basis with others. A theory of social justice in education is essential. Brighouse (2002: 181) states that until recently there was no theory of justice in education and that one cannot simply read a theory off from Rawls, Young, Giddens, or any other author. This article critically reviewed a number of theories that could inform such a theory of social justice in education. It argued that social justice is an ideal — a vision that must become a way of life that permeates all aspects of being human. For this reason it cannot be legislated or achieved by means of international conventions or declarations — albeit important instruments to promote social justice; social justice must be lived. It requires that every citizen must take the responsibility to protect, advance and promote the values, principles and ideals of social justice. The road to achieving this is, however, obstructed by geo-historical and scarcity challenges confronting developing countries. These challenges and their negative impact on achieving social justice in education must be addressed in an ordered and well-structured manner without creating new forms of social injustice. As long as poverty, unemployment and high levels of violence exist, there cannot be social justice. This is the real challenge and it is a journey on which all developing countries and their people must embark. In Long walk to freedom Nelson Mandela (1994a: 751) asserts: Some say that (the liberation of the oppressed and the oppressor) has now been achieved. But I know that that is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free: we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.

#### The alternative is no borders --- it solves the entirety of the aff and erases the idea of immigration completely

Gilbert 5 (Lauren, Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1988; B.A., Harvard University, 1983., FIELDS OF HOPE, FIELDS OF DESPAIR: LEGISPRUDENTIAL AND HISTORIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE AGJOBS BILL OF 2003, lexis, Summer 2005)

Each of the legisprudential theories discussed above is helpful in understanding aspects of the AgJobs story. No single theory, however, is sufficient for fully capturing the complexities of the legislative process in the context of immigration reform. Pluralism theories, both traditional pluralism and public choice, are essential for understanding how grower associations and the United Farmworkers were able to come together to negotiate compromise legislation and how AgJobs was able to achieve supermajority co-sponsorship in the Senate. Process theories are useful for understanding the failure of the AgJobs bill to make its way through the Senate. The series of vetogates placed in the path of AgJobs in the House and Senate in 2000 and 2003-2004, including the committee hearing process, the [\*476] amendment process, and the role of the Senate filibuster, ensured that the bill could only make its way through the legislative process if it achieved major support on both sides of the aisle. Institutional theories become essential in understanding why overwhelming support in the Senate did not ensure passage, shedding light on the institutional interdependence of the various branches of government and how this influences the actions of political actors. Finally, critical legal theory offers a discerning perspective on other legisprudential theories, helping to demonstrate the powerful role played by elite growers and raising questions about the dark side of pluralism and process theories. It debunks the notion that formal access to the political process is necessarily meaningful access, while at the same time challenging scholars to consider alternative models for bringing about progressive change. This Article proposes a new pluralist model for analyzing immigration reform that draws on each of these different theories, but emphasizes the role of the various actors in the political process, including state and non-governmental actors, as well as international actors, including foreign governments and intergovernmental institutions. This new model is called "biennial factionalism," because of the tendency of the political process to renew or reinvent itself every two years, in a somewhat cyclical repetition of new attempts at legislative reform. Under the model of biennial factionalism, the only constant in the political process would be the constitutional structure of U.S. government. Each actor in this process could be seen as a political variable, with different actors wielding different degrees of power.

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#### Chinese influence is increasing and replacing Mexico’s need for US involvement

Shahani ’13 – Arjan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” AQ, 6/5/13, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico>

Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint, Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Peña Nieto’s participation in the conference of the Boao Forum For Asia—a China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forum—and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexico’s global pivot. President Xi’s visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral commercial and diplomatic relationship. Fox and Calderón did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Calderón angered the Chinese government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal government and representatives from the private sector involved in President Xi’s visit are predicting the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Darío Celis in a June 3 radio interview that “agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future.” Grijalva estimates that “during Peña’s administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports, telecom projects, and railway transportation systems.” A joint declaration signed and issued by Peña Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries, infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil industry. In addition, it was announced that sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China. Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Peña Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working relationship between their tourism ministries. In the political arena, Peña Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderón’s diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the “One China” principle. Peña Nieto stated that it is Mexico’s position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that “given the improvement of diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit to both nations.” They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xi’s visit shows, the coming years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial way—while breaking Mexico’s trade dependency on the U.S. market.

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Key to Chinese oil security

Cerna ‘11 – Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>]

China’s thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. “Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. It’s a win-win solution,” said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chile’s total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. “Just one of China’s loans, the $10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008,” according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuela’s Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuela’s desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).

#### Chinese energy insecurity causes Asia war

Brandenburg 3/24/20**’**11 Colonel James A. – United States Air Force, China’s Energy Insecurity and the South China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7

In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the South China Sea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security. However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and China’s mercantilist approach to securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US.16 Feelings of insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea. Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races, nuclear proliferation, and other forms of instability… in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of geopolitical rivalry.17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, China’s dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on China’s economy and the potential impact of shrinking energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

## off

#### The United States Federal Government should issue revised regulations for temporary agricultural visas as per our ACIR evidence – we reserve the right to clarify

#### CP solves the case – avoids costs and delays

ACIR 10 – Agriculture Coalition for Immigration Reform (“SUMMARY OF THE FINAL 2010 H-2A REGULATIONS”, 2010, <https://www.farmcrediteast.com/en/Industry-Support/~/media/Files/Knowledge%20Exchange/SummaryofFinalObamaH2ARegs.ashx>)

The regulatory chaos that has ensued during the past several years has made it exceedingly difficult for current and potential H-2A users to understand and comply with the complex rules that govern participation in the H-2A program.1 They are effective on March 15, 2010. Those who file applications to participate in the H-2A program with dates of need on or after June 1, 2010 must comply with the new rules. 2The final regulations can be found at 75 Federal Register 6884-6995 (February 12, 2010). In addition, DOL published in the Federal Register on February 18, 2010 the 2010 adverse effect wage rates (AEWR) that will be effective on March 15, 2010. 75 Federal Register 7293-94 (February 18, 2010). American agriculture submitted extensive comments on the practical problems created by the proposed regulations. While a few suggestions were adopted by DOL in its final rule, the final regulations retain almost all of those provisions that will make the program difficult and costly to use and which will subject agricultural businesses to substantial exposure from overly broad and punitive enforcement measures for violation of highly complex and technical program terms. Following is a summary of some of the more problematic provisions of the rules that: • Fail to balance the interests of U.S. workers not to be adversely affected by foreign workers with the need of employers to have a readily accessible program that affords timely access to foreign workers at a reasonable cost. The singular focus of the regulations is protection of U.S. workers at all costs, without adequate justification; • Establish a cumbersome, lengthy and costly labor certification application process and onerous enforcement provisions that were justified by the simplified attestation process in the Bush regulations but not in the context of the new certification process. The rule will have an especially negative effect on small businesses; • Retain the 60-75 day recruitment and filing period in advance of the date of need that makes anticipation of labor needs difficult and which fails to provide a realistic picture of the availability of recruited domestic workers during that period; Eliminate the responsibility of the State Workforce Agencies (SWA) to verify the work authorization of their referrals, resulting in referral of unauthorized workers, leaving employers vulnerable if they are later audited by Immigration and Customs Enforcement; • Eliminate the ability of H-2A workers to perform limited incidental agricultural work outside of the job description without violating program terms and subjecting employers to potential debarment if incidental work is performed; • Establish an unprecedented and overly broad definition of corresponding employment, the literal terms of which will require that all U.S. workers in an employer’s workforce be provided payment of the elevated wage rates of the H-2A program, as all H-2A program benefits, including free housing and in-bound and out-bound transportation; • Reinstate the AEWR from the 1989 regulations with adverse modifications, including the unprecedented requirement to increase wages if the prevailing wage rate increases during the contract period; • Replaces the longstanding definition of strike and lockout with an unprecedented definition that allows two persons declaring themselves on strike or locked to block access to any H-2A workers; • Create ambiguity as to when H-2A workers must be given disclosure of the job order or contract in a foreign country; • Impose a new Fair Labor Standards Act requirement, never previously noticed to the public, that transportation, subsistence and visa and related border crossing fees paid by the employee coming to work for the employer cannot reduce the first week’s wages below the minimum wage and which conflicts with DOL’s longstanding rule requiring such reimbursement after 50% of the contract period is completed; and • Retain virtually unchanged the punitive enforcement provisions, including concurrent debarment authority for WHD and ETA, and elevated civil money penalties. The practical impact of the rules will be to diminish program participation because of their complexity, cost, and punitive provisions. The rules take effect at a time when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is expanding worksite enforcement and audits and the need for agriculture to have a viable H-2A program has never been higher. Employers are caught in a vice between DHS and DOL enforcement. The need for a legislative fix of the H-2A program through Congressional enactment of the extensive H-2A reforms of the Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act (AgJOBS) has never been higher. AgJOBS would achieve extensive statutory reforms that would establish fair and balanced H-2A provisions with respect to a streamlined application process, wage relief, housing flexibility, program expansion to certain industries such as dairy currently ineligible to use the program, and a uniform and streamlined legal framework for the settlement of disputes.

#### CP avoids politics

Hanson 7 – Gordon H. director of the Center on Pacific Economies and professor of economics at University of California, San Diego (“The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration”, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, April 2007)

To succeed, a temporary immigration program would have to allow for flexibility and speed in hiring. Existing hiring of illegal immigrants much more closely resembles practices in the rapidly expanding U.S. temporary employment industry than it does employment of H-2 visa holders. Temporary employment agencies match a large stock of workers to an ever change pool of employers. Given the difficulties that the Department of Homeland Security has had in tracking legal immigrants in the country, there would be obvious complications in implementing a program that allowed temporary immigrant workers to be matched to multiple employers in succession. However, without such a dynamic matching process, a temporary immigration program could not effectively respond to the rapid pace of change in U.S. labor market conditions, which would limit the interest of U.S. employers in utilizing the system. Few existing legislative proposals offer specifics for how new temporary immigration programs would be implemented. Crucial to any program’s success would be incorporating features that encourage the active participation of U.S. employers.52 The most divisive issue surrounding immigration reform is whether to offer illegal immigrants an opportunity to legalize their status. One view is that there is no other means, save politically unacceptable mass deportations, to reduce the number of illegal aliens in the country. Another view is that legalizing unauthorized entrants rewards individuals who have broken the law and creates an incentive for continued illegal immigration in the future. Opponents to legalization cite the surge in illegal immigration after the IRCA amnesty in the late 1980s as evidence that granting legal status to illegal aliens does not solve the problem.

## Agriculture

#### Turn---mechanization is key to the agriculture industry

Halle 7 (Sara R. Halle, J.D. Drake University Law School, 2007, PROPOSING A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO A THREE-PART AMERICAN MESS: U.S. AGRICULTURE, ILLEGAL LABOR, AND HARVEST MECHANIZATION, 12 Drake J. Agric. L. 359)

Unfortunately, it looks as though United States agriculture will continue down the same short-sighted path it has been on for the last century. Though proposals calling for a new guest worker program such as President Bush's January 7, 2005 proposal are unlikely to be enacted, continuation of the status quo will lead to more problems for U.S. agricultural production. U.S. dependency on the cheap labor provided by guest workers and illegal immigrants, and their dependency on American agricultural jobs, will continue to grow. In the meantime, U.S. agriculture will become **increasingly unable to compete with Third World countries' production of agricultural goods**, due to the appallingly substandard wages they pay (even by American agriculture's standard). Furthermore, U.S. agriculture will be left in agricultural production's primitive past - hand harvesting - as other First World countries mechanize production of agricultural goods. Eventually, this path will lead to the demise of the American agricultural industry. Some believe the end of American agriculture is inevitable. 252 If the United States continues down this path, **that is certainly true.** Reducing American agriculture's dependency on cheap immigrant labor and mechanizing the harvesting process is the United States' only hope of salvaging its agricultural industry. This process will require the investment of much time and money. It will require lead-time, in which to plan and implement the various necessary programs (i.e., a program to verify workers' legal status, an [\*389] enforcement program through the INS, etc.). 253 A crucial transition period will also be necessary, during which a labor supply will be needed. 254 This should not pose a problem given the large supply of willing, albeit mostly illegal, supply of farm workers currently in the country. This process begins with the mechanization of agricultural production. Government, universities, and private corporations will need to invest major resources in the research, development, and implementation of mechanical harvesting technology. Next, the domestic farm worker base must be restored. The development of labor-aids, labor-saving machines, and robotic systems will greatly assist this process greatly, by making work easier and more highly skilled, requiring fewer workers, and increasing wages for those who remain. Simultaneously, the needs of farmers must be addressed and the supply of illegal labor needs to be controlled. This will occur through stricter enforcement of employer sanctions and workplace arrests of illegal workers, as well as helping farmers to verify the legal status of their employees. For this to occur the INS needs more financial resources and political support and a centralized program for the verification of workers' legal status needs to be implemented. Finally, conditions on farms need to improve and workers' rights must be protected. United States agriculture cannot be sustained with an unwilling or coerced workforce. Because whether they stay in the United States is directly related to their employability, farm workers are unable to protect themselves against workplace violations such as illegally low wages or substandard living conditions. Therefore, farm workers' rights need to be enforced on their behalf. Improved conditions for farm workers, foreign and domestic, will help to usher in the transition from dependency on foreign laborers to the mechanization of the harvesting process and restoration of the domestic farm workforce. [\*390] United States agriculture has a long road ahead. But it will not succeed without the support of government, educational and research institutions, private corporations, and especially politicians. President Bush is correct in believing that "our nation needs an immigration system that serves the American economy, and reflects the American Dream." 255 He is incorrect insofar as he believes a new guest worker program is the way to go about accomplishing that goal. **The crucial step is undoubtedly a** major implementation of harvest mechanization. **It is said technology is the future. The American agricultural sector must begin to utilize 21st century technology in its production process, or** accept that it has no future here.

#### U.S. ag booming

The Economist 13

Fields of gold

http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21572212-farmers-bask-soaring-prices-fields-gold

In recent years strong global demand for food and biofuels has been pushing crop prices higher. The drought has helped, not hindered, profits. For farmers able to produce corn (maize), it raised prices dramatically. The average price of corn was about 20% higher last year than in 2010, and reached $8.49 a bushel (25kg) in August. For everyone else crop-insurance payments have stepped in, reaching a record $14.2 billion in payments in mid-February, a figure that is expected to go on growing a bit as insurers finalise the claims. This year, according to a report from the USDA on February 11th, farm profits may rise by 14% to $128 billion, the highest in real terms since 1973. As crops are bringing in higher prices, and with interest rates at historic lows, farmland has become increasingly valuable to investors. Prices have been rising surprisingly fast. According to a new report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, prices in the Midwest leapt by 16% last year. Moreover, 2012 was the third consecutive year of big jumps in agricultural land values, and the increase was the third-largest since the late 1970s. Between 2010 and 2012 values rose by a cumulative 52%, matching the gains of 40 years ago. Land values in Iowa, the biggest corn and soyabean producer, jumped 20%, the most among the five big agricultural Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin are the others). The Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas City, which covers a different area, also reports a 20-25% increase in farmland prices from a year ago.

#### No war Indo-Pak war

Ganguly, 8

[Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70]

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability.

Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993:.

The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87

Subrahmanyam’s argument takes on additional significance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan.

#### Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies

Allouche, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

## Manufacturing

#### No internal link – H1B’s already prefer high-tech workers so status quo solves the aff

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Visas don’t solve – Paone card is in the context of advanced warfighting technology, not manufacturing capabilities

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### They are wrong about everything

Bernstein et al. 2K (Steven Bernstein, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government, Emeritus at Darthmouth University and Professor of War Studies, King's College London, Janice Gross Stein, member of the Order of Canada and the Royal Society of Canada, University Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and Associate Chair and Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation, and Steven Weber, professor at the School of Information and the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He holds an M.D. and a Ph.D in political science from Stanford University. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World”, *European Journal of International Relations* 2000 6:43 DOI:10.1177/1354066100006001003)

Many of the scholars responsible for the behavioral revolution in social science were European refugees who sought to use the tools of social science to analyze the causes of war, prejudice, civil unrest and poverty. Their commitment to social science flowed from an even deeper commitment — to use disciplined methodologies to generate knowledge that would help prevent the horrors of war and fascism and improve the world around them. They and their American collaborators were not interested in theory for its own sake, but principally for the capacity it might provide to analyze and address world problems. This vision has been largely lost. From the vantage point of the 21st century, it is sadly apparent that the founding fathers of the behavioral revolution failed to transmit as clearly the value commitments that motivated their ‘scientific’ study of international relations. For many of their students and grand-students, the ‘scientific means’ has become more an end in itself, and the ‘science’ of the social, a jeu d’esprit, like chess. In the worst instances, researchers choose problems to investigate because the problems are thought to be tractable, not because they are important. They evaluate solutions in terms of the elegance of the logic rather than actual evidence. Meanwhile, on the other extreme, those who do study policy problems frequently do so in isolation from those working seriously with theory. Both communities are thus impoverished. The founders of the scientific study of international relations would bemoan the separation of theory from evidence and of logic from data.1 Most of all, the founders would reject the separation of theory from policy and its relative failure to address practical problems of the political world. A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the ‘scientific’ quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet the most relaxed ‘scientific’ tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state — war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states — are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward ‘tracking’ of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena — the trajectories of individual planets — can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherently unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of polarity, relative power and the balance of power are among the most widely used independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be ‘tested’ decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness — although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on ‘idealizations’, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but implicit ‘theories’ about actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars — to continue with the same example — are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a ‘critical mass’ is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information reliably and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one’s own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs. We have descriptive terms like ‘chain reaction’ or ‘contagion effect’ to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships — even if they existed — could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. Any regularities would be ‘soft’; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded in history and have a short half-life. They would decay quickly because of the memories, creative searching and learning by political leaders. Ironically, the ‘findings’ of social science contribute to this decay (Weber, 1969; Almond and Genco, 1977: 496-522; Gunnell, 1982: Ch. 2; Ball, 1987: Ch. 4; Kratochwil, 1989; Rorty, 1989; Hollis, 1994: Ch. 9). Beyond these conceptual and empirical difficulties lies a familiar but fundamental difference of purpose. Boyle’s Law, half-lives, or any other scientific principle based on probability, says nothing about the behavior of single units such as molecules. For many theoretical and practical purposes this is adequate. But social science ultimately aspires — or should aspire — to provide insight into practical world problems that are generally part of a small or very small n. In international relations, the dynamics and outcomes of single cases are often much more important than any statistical regularities. Overcoming Physics Envy The conception of causality on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this — given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in closed systems. Open systems can be influenced by external stimuli, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this a priori from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible.

#### Natural gas prices will bring manufacturing back to the U.S.

Wilmoth 11/15 – Adam, Adam Wilmoth returned to The Oklahoman as energy editor in 2012 after working for four years in public relations. He previously spent seven years as a business reporter at The Oklahoman,  [“Natural gas price trends could boost domestic manufacturing” <http://newsok.com/natural-gas-price-trends-could-boost-domestic-manufacturing/article/3904805/?page=2>]

The vast amount of oil and natural gas available in the United States continues to change world dynamics.¶ The International Energy Agency this week said the trend likely will lead manufacturing jobs to move to the United States and away from Europe and Asia.¶ “Lower energy prices in the United States mean that it is well-placed to reap an economic advantage, while higher costs of energy-intensive industries in Europe and Japan are set to be a heavy burden,” IEA chief economist Fatih Birol said in a statement this week as the IEA released its World Energy Outlook 2013.¶ The report pointed out that natural gas in the United States trades at one-third the import price in Europe and one-fifth the price in Japan.¶ The report found that “large variations in energy prices” will persist through 2035, “affecting company strategies and investment decisions in energy-intensive industries.”¶ “Average Japanese or European industry consumers pay more than twice as much for electricity as their counterparts in the United States, and even China's industry pays almost double the U.S. level,” the report stated.¶ While the IEA report paints a bullish picture for domestic manufacturing, the findings were not all positive for oil and natural gas companies.

#### Manufacturing resilient

Long 11/4 – Clint, Association of Corporate Council [“"Reshoring" gaining momentum among U.S. manufacturers” <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=784cd0f2-a1b6-4b79-9e2f-0dcc8602bbea>]

U.S. manufacturers have moved millions of jobs overseas in search of cheaper labor, less expensive production processes, and a stronger bottom line. In recent months, however, American companies have started to bring some of these jobs back to the United States. This phenomenon, called "reshoring," is occurring due to higher costs of manufacturing in other countries and the increasing economic and other benefits of production in the United States. A brief look at reshoring and the factors that drive it demonstrate that U.S. manufacturers are in a prime position to bring more jobs and production back to the United States. A [Boston Consulting Group](http://www.bcg.com/media/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=tcm:12-144944) study from September 2013 found that over 50 percent of surveyed executives at large U.S. manufacturers said that they have plans to reshore production from China or are "actively considering" it. Recent events demonstrate that U.S. companies are serious about reshoring: Boeing, Ford, and Little Tikes are only a few of the well-known companies that have already brought jobs back to the United States or have announced plans to do so. This recent trend is not exclusive to U.S. companies. The [Wall Street Journal reported](http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303983904579093463623447196) in September that toilet manufacturers from Colombia and Japan are also expanding production capacity in the U.S. and creating jobs in communities in Georgia, Ohio, and Missouri.¶ Multiple factors explain why manufacturers are reshoring jobs and production to the United States. Labor and transportation costs in China have increased. Manufacturing a product in the United States both reduces transportation costs and mitigates transportation risks. Another important factor that multiple companies cite is the growth of U.S. energy production, which has reduced the costs of inputs, transportation, and production in the United States. Furthermore, [as Scott Paul of Alliance for American Manufacturing has stated](http://www.plasticsnews.com/article/20130827/news/130829941/little-tikes-growing-after-shifting-production-from-china-to-us), there is a "surge of interest" among Americans in buying goods that are "Made in the U.S.A."¶ While each manufacturer has a variety of motives for reshoring jobs and production, it is clear that many manufacturers are responding to strong economic incentives to create jobs and expand production in the United States. The United States appears poised to regain some of the jobs that were "offshored" and factories that were closed. This is a positive sign for U.S. manufacturing and the economy as a whole.

#### Recent empirics prove no econ impact

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Mastanduno, 9 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth

(Michael, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

# 2NC

## K

### Alt---2NC

#### This solves our impact and yours.

Dudziak and Volpp 2005 (Mary, Professor of Law and Director of the Project on War and Security in Law, Culture and Society at Emory Law School, Leti, Professor of Law in Access to Justice at Berkeley Law, “Introduction Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction of American Borders”, American Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3, Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction of American Borders (Sep., 2005), pp. 593-610, JSTOR,)

Borders of Identity The shackled foot on the back cover of this volume, belonging to a woman in immigration detention, reminds us how bodies are policed in the service of maintaining national borders. Which bodies can enter and which bodies are expelled, and the attempted enforcement of those decisions, bounds Ameri- can identity through the incorporation of some and the exclusion of others. The typical narrative of America as a nation of immigrants foregrounds a liberal story of social contract and choice, whereby immigrants are welcomed and then easily assimilate as citizens. Race sharply disrupts this narrative, given the facts of slavery, territorial dispossession, forced removals, and racial bars to immigration and naturalization. But this disruption is conventionally pre- sumed not to threaten national myths of freedom and democracy, and to be rectified through the passage of time and progress.14 The essays in this section challenge both presumptions, in excavating and interpreting foundational but little-known dimensions of the restrictions of movement and membership of bodies, and in asserting that the inclusion of citizens is in fact predicated upon exclusion. One way to consider citizenship is to note the hydraulic relationship be- tween the inclusion of some persons as citizens and the exclusion of other persons as the citizens' opposite - as aliens or, post 9/11, as terrorists. But another important and understudied dynamic is the manner in which inclu- sion and exclusion can be experienced by the same bodies. Devon Carbado, in his essay, "Racial Naturalization," addresses the paradox of black American identity, whereby the black American is included as a citizen, and is presumed to belong to America, but also experiences exclusion as racially subordinate. He labels this phenomenon an "inclusionary form of exclusion." Carbado seeks to reconceptualize the relationship between black Ameri- cans and naturalization. To this purpose, he reformulates the concept of natu- ralization, from its formal and doctrinal understandings as the process through which one becomes an American citizen, to a social process producing Ameri- can racial identity, fueled by racism. Tracing the inclusive exclusion of blacks in America to the Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott, he notes how en- slaved blacks were excluded from citizenship but included as property, which he analogizes to unincorporated territories in the Insular Cases, described as "foreign in a domestic sense," not incorporated but "appurtenant thereto as a possession." The granting of formal citizenship through the Fourteenth Amend- ment naturalized blacks as citizens, and included them into an American iden- tity, but an explicitly racially subordinate American identity, visible today in the delimiting of black social movement through the police practice of stop- and-frisk. Carbado s essay helps us understand why racism not only "divides us as Americans" but consolidates American national identity, as it "binds us as a nation in a multiracial hierarchy." If Carbado s essay fills one important gap in studies of naturalization, Siobhan Somerville's "Notes toward a Queer History of Naturalization" addresses an- other. Somerville usefully divides the concept of citizenship in the nation from citizenship in the state; the former could be considered citizenship as a matter of identity - the kinship, belonging, or bond that joins a people and differen- tiates them from others. Citizenship in the state is also called formal citizen- ship, namely the processes that determine legal membership in a territorial community. As she indicates, work on citizenship and sexuality has attended much more closely to citizenship in the nation than to citizenship in the state. But rules of formal citizenship must be understood also as sexualized. National borders are not only material and territorial; they are also rhetori- cal. Conventional renderings of our national narrative cast the immigrant as the desiring subject, longing to come to and belong to America. Somerville examines how the state also functions as a site of affective power, whereby it selects objects of desire and produces them as citizens. Naturalization is pre- sumed to function as a salutary corrective to birthright citizenship, as mod- eled along the lines of contract and choice rather than ascriptive, accidental characteristics based upon blood. This essay casts a powerful challenge to that presumption, in discerning how, at the inception of the American nation, naturalization did not escape a sexualized logic of belonging. Rather, in the early national period, naturalization depended upon the transmission of citi- zenship through biological reproduction and presumed only certain subjects as "naturalizable," as capable of "surviving or reproducing as if native." Thus, sexuality has stood at the core of determining which bodies can be incorpo- rated into belonging

### FW---2NC

#### Inclusivity in politics is dead, their framework is a violent reification of majoritarianism---our framework solves the case better because it is a pre-requisite to pragmatism

Gilbert 5 (Lauren, Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1988; B.A., Harvard University, 1983., FIELDS OF HOPE, FIELDS OF DESPAIR: LEGISPRUDENTIAL AND HISTORIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE AGJOBS BILL OF 2003, lexis, Summer 2005)

The discourse of critical legal studies scholars, with regard to the structural tension of respecting majority rule while protecting minority rights, usually involves discussions regarding the appropriate role of judicial review and the countermajoritarian difficulty. n431 However, it also has relevance in analyzing issues of access to the political process. Critical legal studies, Critical Race, Latcrit, and feminist scholars help to debunk the myth that formal access to the political process is meaningful access. They underscore that certain political actors wield much greater influence over the political process, usually in proportion to their financial status, than others. n432 They emphasize that legal norms are often constructed on the foundation of oppressive and violent power structures. n433 Indeed, they critique the [\*475] view that associates, on the one hand, an orderly political process with peace and, on the other, disorder with violence. n434 Nonetheless, critical legal studies, while offering a valuable critique of process and pluralism theories, including a deeper understanding of issues of unequal access to the political process, may have discounted the role that progressive social movements can play in bringing about change through legislative advocacy. In 1831, de Tocqueville commented on the power of associations: Citizens who are individually powerless do not very clearly anticipate the strength that they may acquire by uniting together; it must be shown to them in order to be understood ... a thousand citizens do not see what interest they have in combining together; ten thousand will be perfectly aware of it. n435 He recognized that unrestrained liberty of association could threaten to throw the country into a state of anarchy, n436 but ultimately concluded that "extreme democracy," including freedom of association, would obviate the dangers of democracy, especially the tyranny of the majority. n437 The reality is that political decisions frequently do not reflect the will of the majority. Often they are the result of the influence of a powerful elite on the political process, but they can also be the result of well-organized lobbies by public interest groups. This realization, rather than disempowering minority groups like the farmworkers, can often be the inspiration needed to bring about progressive change.

## Manufacturing Advantage

#### Empirics prove – economic crisis for over three years created no conflicts – other proximate causes triggered their examples, that’s Barnett --- finishing here

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

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### Heg D

#### Even if heg is good, US wouldn’t deploy – offshore balancing and nukes solve the impact

Adams, Professor U.S. Foreign Policy Program – American University, Distinguished Fellow – Stimson Center, ‘11

(Gordon, “A Leaner and Meaner Defense,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 Iss. 1, January/February)

Some people point to China as a successor to the Soviet Union and cite it as a reason why preventing and preparing for nuclear or large-scale conventional war should remain priority missions. They highlight the risk of a U.S.-Chinese conflict over Taiwan or the possibility that China will deny the U.S. military access to the western Pacific. Of course, China is a rising power that is making increasingly substantial investments in defense. But it is important not to overreact to this fact. Focusing on China's military capabilities ought not replace a broader strategy. As the United States determines how to engage China and how to protect its interests in Asia generally, it must balance the diplomatic, economic, and financial, as well as the military, elements of its policy. Most defense analysts estimate that China's military investments and capabilities are decades behind those of the United States, and there is very little evidence that China seeks a conventional conflict with the United States. There is substantial evidence that China's economic and financial policy is a more urgent problem for the United States, but one of the best ways for the United States to respond to that is to get its fiscal house in order.

The prospect of a major war with other states is even less plausible. Defense planning scenarios in the 1990s were built around the possibility of two conflicts. The one involving Iraq is now off the table. A conflict with North Korea was the second, but although that country's military is numerically impressive, South Korea's state-of-the-art armed forces can manage that challenge without needing the assistance of U.S. troops. The United States can now limit its contribution to strategic nuclear deterrence, air support, and offshore naval balancing in the region. The prospect of a conventional war with Iran is not credible. Iran's vast size, to say nothing of the probability that the population would be hostile to any U.S. presence there, means that anything more than U.S. air strikes and Special Forces operations targeting Iranian nuclear capabilities is unlikely.

Given the stakes, some hedging for these exceedingly low-probability risks is reasonable. But even a smaller U.S. force and budget than today's would be ample because many of these risks are less likely than ever and the United States' allies now enjoy unprecedented military and strategic advantages. The most vexing missions are those at the heart of the Quadrennial Defense Review: counterinsurgency, nation building, and the building of other countries' security sectors, among others. And these, alongside competition with China, are motivating Gates and other planners at the Pentagon, despite Gates' acknowledgment in this magazine last spring that "the United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq anytime soon -- that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire." Such planned missions are based on a misguided premise: that the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq foreshadow the need for a large U.S. military force to increasingly intervene in failing states teeming with insurgents and terrorists. But Gates' effort to nonetheless tailor U.S. military capabilities to such tasks suggests that there is still significant support for them in the Pentagon. According to General George Casey, the army chief of staff, for example, the United States is in an "era of persistent conflict." Yet the United States is very unlikely to embark on another regime-change and nation-building mission in the next decade -- nor should it. Indeed, in the wake of its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the demand for the United States to act as global policeman will decline.

Pakistan is often cited as a state that might require such an intervention. Clearly, it is the case that Gates had in mind when he worried about "a nuclear-armed state [that] could collapse into chaos and criminality." But even if Pakistan collapsed, the U.S. government would probably not send in massive forces for fear of facing widespread popular opposition and an armed resistance in the more remote parts of the country. More likely, the U.S. government would resort to air power and Special Forces in order to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is clear that U.S. forces are not suited to lengthy occupations, especially when they involve a stabilization mission, governance reform, and economic development.

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## PTX

#### Triggers biological warfare and draw in Russia and China

Dennis Ray Morgan 9, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693

This scenario has gained even more plausibility since a January 2007 Sunday Times report [13] of an Israeli intelligence leak that Israel was considering a strike against Iran, using low-yield bunker busting nukes to destroy Iran’s supposedly secret underground nuclear facilities. In Moore’s scenario, non-nuclear neighboring countries would then respond with conventional rockets and chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Israel then would retaliate with nuclear strikes on several countries, including a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, who then retaliates with an attack not only on Israel but pre-emptively striking India as well. Israel then initiates the ‘‘Samson option’’ with attacks on other Muslim countries, Russia, and possibly the ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ cities of Europe. At that point, all-out nuclear war ensues as the U.S. retaliates with nuclear attacks on Russia and possibly on China as well.11

#### Biowarfare triggers extinction

Anders Sandberg 8, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Pressure means Iran sanctions won’t come to a vote---but there’s still a fight

Sorcher 2-27 (Sara- journalist for National Journal; “Big Democratic Donors Urge Congress to Back Off Iran Sanctions”; Feb. 27, 2014; <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/big-democratic-donors-urge-congress-to-back-off-iran-sanctions-20140227>)

Dozens of major Democratic donors are urging congressional leaders to oppose any new sanctions or legislation that could jeopardize ongoing negotiations between world powers and Iran.

The letter, signed by 82 donors, the majority of them Jewish, could be a boon for President Obama's diplomatic efforts, which resulted in a controversial deal that curbed major aspects of Iran's nuclear program temporarily as negotiations to reach a permanent deal continue.

Obama has promised to veto new sanctions, but Republicans are trying anyway to revive a sanctions bill by Sens. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., and Mark Kirk, R-Ill., which had 59 cosponsors. In the coming days, key speakers, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, are expected to press Congress to keep the financial noose tight around Iran at a conference held by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington's best-known pro-Israel lobby.

The donors' letter may help weaken some of that momentum.

"Although success in achieving a final agreement is far from guaranteed, Congress should allow these fragile negotiations to proceed without making threats that could derail them or tying the hands of the negotiators by imposing unrealistic terms for a final agreement," the donors wrote Thursday to senior Democrats, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Majority Whip Dick Durbin, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, and House Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer.

National Journal previously reported that diplomacy with Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, and the growth of alternative pro-Israel groups make it easier for lawmakers to oppose Iran sanctions than it has been in years past.

The new push from Democratic donors—including Ben Cohen, formerly of Vermont-based Ben & Jerry's ice cream; Victor Kovner, a fixture in the Democratic fundraising world since the Clinton administration; and former Sierra Club Foundation President Guy Saperstein—could go a long way toward convincing Democrats that supporting their president's interim agreement with Iran is a politically tenable option.

"This is the political center of gravity of the Democratic Party telling Congress there is no political need to do what the organizations pushing hawkish actions on Iran want you to do," a lobbyist arguing against new Iran sanctions said under condition of anonymity.

Praising the agreement between six world powers and Iran in November as a "first step" toward a comprehensive agreement to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the donors echoed Obama's State of the Union claims that Iran has begun to freeze, and roll back, parts of its program under stringent international monitoring for the first time in a decade.

The donors insist that lawmakers should be aware of Iran's threats that new sanctions—even if they did not take effect immediately—would be seen as a violation of the interim agreement and could rupture negotiations. "Passing such legislation would likely lead to an immediate and substantial lessening of economic pressure on Iran because other countries, like China, Russia, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, India and Turkey might cease implementing sanctions on the ground that the U.S. had undermined negotiations," the letter said.

Congress could always pass new sanctions if Iran violated the agreement, the donors said. However, for their part, Netanyahu and pro-Israel groups in the U.S. supporting Israeli leadership on this issue want to keep the pressure tight during the interim deal, which does not fully dismantle Tehran's nuclear program.

The donors also take what is sure to be a controversial stand on uranium enrichment.

Some members of Congress are insisting that Iran give up enriching uranium, even to low levels, which the Islamic Republic has already decried as a deal-breaker. Putting such a provision into law would threaten talks by "tying the hands" of both U.S. negotiators and Rouhani, "who could not feasibly finalize a deal that zeroes out domestic enrichment," the letter said.

"Like sanctions, such a legislative poison pill would only serve to erode the prospects for diplomatic success," the letter continued. "Even if congressional action took the form of a nonbinding resolution, or if the president vetoed such legislation, its initial passage would strengthen the hand of Iranian hard-liners arguing against negotiations on the ground that Congress will not accept any deal reached at the negotiating table."

Diplomacy's failure now, the donors continued, would either lead to military action or Iran getting a nuclear weapon. "We urge you to oppose risky congressional action that, if taken, may lead you to wake up the next morning knowing the result has been to take the diplomatic option off the table," they wrote.

#### Top experts agree it won’t come up for a vote, but GOP Senators like McConnell and Burr are still aggressively pushing---Reid won’t let a vote happen now because of Obama support

Huffington Post 2-26 (“Top Foreign Relations Republican Predicts Iran Sanctions Won't Get A Vote”; 2/26/14; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/26/bob-corker-iran-sanctions\_n\_4861429.html)

WASHINGTON -- The top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is admitting that the GOP push to attach Iran sanctions to a veterans benefits bill will not succeed.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) are leading the effort to pass new Iran sanctions, even though the White House has warned that such a move could make war more likely.

The Obama administration has little to worry about, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) suggested Wednesday.

"It doesn't look to me like we're going to get a vote," Corker told several reporters on Capitol Hill.

Many Democrats have signaled support for new sanctions, but Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) backed away from taking a vote, deferring to White House concerns that it could harm ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. Reid has criticized the Republican attempt to force a vote on sanctions as politicizing the issue. Besides the veterans bill, GOP senators tried earlier in the week to attach sanctions to measures aimed at curbing sexual assault in the military.

Corker declined to criticize that effort, saying the matter needs to be debated, but he offered no endorsement of his colleagues' specific tactic.

"I think Congress weighing in strongly, in some form or fashion, on the biggest foreign policy issue we have underway right now kind of makes sense. It's kind of what you do when you're in the United States Senate," Corker said. "Whether it's exactly this piece of legislation or whether it's something else, I think it makes sense for Congress to weigh in."

The key goal, he suggested, is to make clear what will trigger tougher U.S. sanctions should Iran continue to develop nuclear weapons capabilities.

"I think there are very legitimate concerns about the sanctions dissipating, and you never end up with a deal and have a series of rolling agreements," Corker said. "To us, the most important element is to define what the end has to be," he added. "As their economy begins to recover, which it is ... we're going to lose the traction that we have on this issue."

Last month Corker supported delaying a sanctions vote until summer, giving six months for the Obama administration's efforts to play out.

For Burr, the top Republican on the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, linking Iran sanctions to the veterans benefits bill makes sense because Republicans see few other chances to work their will on legislation.

"Leader Reid, before we left last year, stood on the Senate floor and said we will vote on Iran sanctions as soon as we come back. ... How long do we wait?" Burr told reporters Wednesday. "What Leader Reid is likely to do is take all votes and push them past the November election."

And that, Burr said, was not something the United States or its allies could afford with Iran.

"Three or four months can make huge differences as it relates to who our friends are around the world," Burr said. "They're out shopping for new friends because they look at our actions on Iran and think that we've taken our eye off the ball, and we're not concerned with what is their greatest threat."

Burr noted another advantage to tying Iran sanctions to the veterans measure: The latter might actually pass.

"It happens to be a vehicle that might leave the United States Senate, and therefore it is an appropriate vehicle," he said.

Reid later slammed the GOP move, reading from a letter signed by veterans groups critical of linking Iran to their bill. He said all the Republicans were interested in doing was playing political games.

"What are we doing here today? Nothing," Reid said. "It is a waste of time. And why are they doing that? Because they don't want to legislate."

Corker was more charitable about the sanctions push, even though he saw no chance of success. "For Congress to weigh in, in some way, and at least define the end state, what we think is acceptable, in some form or fashion, I think that's probably helpful to the process," he said.

**Obama’s diplomatic efforts are working---he needs more Congressional support**

**The Iranian 2/12** [http://iranian.com/posts/view/post/28316]

More than one hundred members of the House of Representatives — Democrats and Republicans — have signed a letter supporting President Obama’s diplomatic approach to Iran’s nuclear program and urging their colleagues to avoid passing “bills or resolutions” that could jeopardize current talks with Tehran.¶ The push to pass more sanctions on Iran has stalled for now, but House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) is reportedly working with Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD) on text for a non-binding resolution outlining acceptable outcomes of any final agreement with Iran over its nuclear program (Hoyer backed off the resolution in December after pressure from Obama administration officials, other lawmakers and activists).¶ “At present,” the letter reads, “we believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance. A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided.”¶ The letter had around 70 signatories when it was first reported to be circulating among House members earlier this month. But now, the final letter to the President has 104 signatures, including from 4 Republicans, clearly providing a boost to the Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts.¶ Reps. David Price (D-NC) and Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) spearheaded the effort. “I believe that we must take advantage of the opportunity before us to pursue a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, and that we must resist calls by some in Congress to prematurely enact a bill or resolution that risks inadvertently derailing or impeding our ongoing negotiations,” Price said in a statement.¶ “While difficult and uncertain, diplomacy represents our best hope to prevent nuclear weapons in Iran and ensure the safety of our families and others around the world. Congress should not undermine diplomacy by giving the Iranian hardliners an excuse to scuttle the negotiations. So many of our colleagues have expressed their determination for diplomacy, and so many more share the same view,” Doggett said.¶ With the new sanctions bill “on ice” and the interim deal currently solidified and taking effect (with a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program and more inspections), the congressional debate now appears to be looking toward the final nuclear agreement with Iran.¶ Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN) said this week that those who say that Iran should dismantle its nuclear infrastructure and permanently end its uranium enrichment program as part of the final deal, aren’t being realistic. “I don’t believe that there is a deal that Iran can agree to that will completely zero out their program,” he said. “So I think that anyone who insists on that provision basically is insisting that there not be a final deal.”

**Sanctions won’t pass now---bipartisan support for diplomacy---Obama pressure key to deter legislation**

**Shapiro 2/11** [http://www.sdjewishworld.com/2014/02/11/opposition-iran-sanctions-gains-house/]

A letter to President Barack Obama drafted by U.S. Reps. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) and David Price (D-NC) has been recently circulating on Capitol Hill. A final call to sign the message, titled “Give Diplomacy a Chance Letter to POTUS,” made the rounds of congressional offices Monday after being sent by Jackson Tufts, a military legislative assistant to Price.¶ The letter, which according to Anya Malkov, a legislative assistant to Doggett, was signed by “more than 90 members, including several Republicans,” opposes additional sanctions as detrimental to the diplomacy being wrought by Secretary of State John Kerry in the quest to prevent the development of a nuclear-armed Iran.¶ “We understand that there is no assurance of success and that, if talks break down or Iran reneges on pledges it made in the interim agreement, Congress may be compelled to act as it has in the past by enacting additional sanctions legislation,” reads one of the final drafts of the letter. “At present, however, we believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance. A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided.”¶ According to Price’s office, the letter is supported by a number of organizations, and was initiated on the Hill sometime after the Jan. 28 State of the Union Address in which Obama vehemently criticized congressional action pushing for more sanctions. Organizations like J Street, Ploughshares, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Win Without War, and Americans for Peace Now are among those mobilizing their supporters in favor of the letter and against harsher Iran sanctions in general.¶ When contacted with questions about J Street’s involvement with the letter, a spokesman for the organization told JNS.org that the group would not be making public comments until the letter is finalized.¶ Another early supporter of the letter was U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), a Muslim legislator whose office is rumored to have helped circulate the letter to other offices.¶ “A large number of House Democrats are unified against actions that could undermine diplomacy,” Ellison said in a statement to JNS.org. “Negotiations with Iran are complex and we may not reach a final agreement in exactly six months, but we’re the closest we’ve ever been to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”¶ Signatories to the letter also include Jewish members of Congress with known pro-Israel voting records. Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) was one of the leaders in the effort. U.S. Rep. John Yarmuth (D-KY) also signed the letter, according to his communications director. Yarmuth had been a vocal opponent of additional Iran sanctions even before the P5+1 agreement with Iran went into effect late last year.¶ “As an American first, but also as a Jewish American, I strongly support Israel’s security and our nation’s commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons,” Yarmuth said in a short speech on the House floor Jan. 15. “I also fully support advancing peace and stability in the Middle East through diplomacy whenever possible.”¶ “We are in the midst of a historic opportunity to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran, but it is fragile,” he continued. “Congressional interference at such a sensitive time is a high-risk, no-reward proposition.”¶ Other than the members of Congress who informed JNS.org of their position on the letter when contacted, at press time there was no official, comprehensive list of signatories available.¶ Though 90 signatories is far from a majority of the 435-member House, and there are no known plans for the House to take up sanctions legislation, the letter’s backers intend to balance the pro-sanctions voices in Congress.¶ As it stands right now, legislative action on the matter is in the Senate in the form of the Mendendez-Kirk bill, S. 1881. Last month, **the Obama administration began lobbying the bipartisan bill’s Democratic sponsor, efforts which appear to have successfully turned the tide in the White House’s favor.**

**Won’t pass now---Obama key to appease pro-sanction Republicans**

**The Hill 2/12** [http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/198221-house-dems-back-obama-on-iran]

Half of the Democrats in the House weighed in against taking immediate action on Iran Wednesday, sending a letter to President Obama that backs his position.¶ The letter from 100 Democrats — and four Republicans — comes just days after 42 Republican senators sent Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) a partisan letter demanding that he schedule a vote on sanctions legislation immediately. The most recent sanctions bills, in contrast, passed the House 400-20 and the Senate 100-0.¶ “We believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance,” the House letter states. “A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided.”¶ The letter is the latest win for the White House, which has threatened to veto sanctions legislation that it says would derail diplomacy. America's largest pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, announced last week that it was not pushing for an immediate vote on the bill.¶ The letter praises Obama's “robust diplomacy” and commends him for the interim nuclear deal reached in Geneva last year.¶ Many Republicans have called the deal, which freezes Iran's nuclear program and loosens sanctions, a disaster.¶ “Should negotiations fail or falter, nothing precludes a change in strategy,” the House letter says. “But we must not imperil the possibility of a diplomatic success before we even have a chance to pursue it.”¶ Key Democrats, including House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and House Foreign Affairs ranking member Rep. Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), declined to sign. Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), Richard Hanna (R-N.Y.), Walter Jones (R-N.C.) and John Duncan Jr. (R-Tenn.) joined the Democrats on the letter.¶ Here's the full text of the letter:¶ Dear Mr. President,¶ As Members of Congress—and as Americans—we are united in our unequivocal commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would threaten the security of the United States and our allies in the region, particularly Israel. ¶ The ongoing implementation of the Joint Plan of Action agreed to by Iran and the “P5+1” nations last November increases the possibility of a comprehensive and verifiable international agreement. We understand that there is no assurance of success and that, if talks break down or Iran reneges on pledges it made in the interim agreement, Congress may be compelled to act as it has in the past by enacting additional sanctions legislation. At present, however, we believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance. A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided.¶ We remain wary of the Iranian regime. But we believe that robust diplomacy remains our best possible strategic option, and we commend you and your designees for the developments in Geneva. Should negotiations fail or falter, nothing precludes a change in strategy. But we must not imperil the possibility of a diplomatic success before we even have a chance to pursue it.

**Obama’s successfully held off groups like the AIPAC**

**The Huffington Post 2/12** [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/house-iran-sanctions-vote\_n\_4775072.html]

WASHINGTON -- A bipartisan group of 104 House members urged Congress in a letter sent Wednesday to President Barack Obama not to vote on an Iran sanctions bill while an interim agreement between the Iran and the West is in place.¶ "We understand that there is no assurance of success and that, if talks break down or Iran reneges on pledges it made in the interim agreement, Congress may be compelled to act as it has in the past by enacting additional sanctions legislation," wrote the members. "At present, however, we believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance. A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided."¶ The effort represents a momentum shift in the House against sanctions. A bill backing sanctions passed in the chamber by a 400-20 vote in July.¶ Reps. Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas) and David Price (D-N.C.) gathered support for the letter, which as of Feb. 3 had more than 70 signatories. They also picked up four Republican signatories -- Reps. John Duncan Jr. (Tenn.), Richard Hanna (N.Y.), Walter Jones (N.C.) and Thomas Massie (Ky.). The only member of the Democratic leadership to sign onto the letter was Assistant Democratic Leader Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-S.C.); House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), House Democratic Whip Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and House Democratic Caucus Chairman Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) did not sign.¶ The letter comes as the effort by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) to pass an Iran sanctions bill has lost steam in the Senate. That bill would hit Iran with more sanctions unless it agreed to restrictions on uranium enrichment that go beyond the current six-month interim agreement negotiated with Western powers. Iran's foreign minister has warned that additional sanctions would kill the interim deal.¶ Even the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee, a prime driver behind the sanctions push, has backed off the idea of holding a vote.¶ Talks between the West and Iran on a permanent agreement for its nuclear program are slated to begin in mid-February.

#### Yes vote—dems will defect if it’s held

Lake 2/11/14

Eli, Daily Beast, “How AIPAC Botched Its Biggest Fight in Years,” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/11/how-aipac-botched-its-biggest-fight-in-years.html>

When AIPAC supported the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill over the objections of the White House, it marked a new phase for the lobby. “There are a lot of Democratic senators who are up for election this year,” one Republican Senate staff member said. “I bet they would vote against the White House if AIPAC pushed for a vote.” **That vote may eventually come.** On Friday, AIPAC President Michael Kassen issued a statement he said he had hoped would clarify what he said was a mischaracterization that AIPAC no longer supported the Kirk-Menendez legislation. “We still have much work to do over the coming months,” he said. “It will be a long struggle, but one that we are committed to fighting.” **Republicans appear keen on fighting that struggle as well.** But it’s not clear whether they will be taking direction from the lobby anymore.

#### GOP wants a vote asap

Demirjian 2/6/14

Karoun, Las Vegas Sun, “Reid breaks silence, pans GOP senators demanding vote on Iran sanctions,” <http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/feb/06/reid-breaks-silence-pans-gop-senators-demanding-vo/>

Coincidentally, the Republicans penning the note Tuesday used the same language in expressing their frustrations to Reid. “We should not allow the administration to turn one of the most bipartisan issues in America into a partisan one,” they wrote. “It’s time to vote.” The group of Republicans **asked Reid** to bring the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act to the floor before the Presidents Day recess. While only Republicans signed the letter, **they aren’t alone in their support for a vote on the bill**. Democrats as **close to Reid** as Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob **Menendez**, D-N.J., and leadership team member Sen. Chuck **Schumer**, D-N.Y., have also co-sponsored the legislation and urged it be brought to a vote. There are presently 59 senators openly supporting the bill, including author Menendez.

#### Iran sanctions have stalled now—insufficient Dem defections to override his veto

JTA, staff writer, 2/6/14, GOP senators press Reid on Iran sanctions vote, www.jta.org/2014/02/06/news-opinion/politics/gop-senators-press-reid-on-iran-sanctions-vote

Forty-two Republican senators urged the Democratic-led Senate’s majority leader, Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.), to bring to a vote a bill on new Iran sanctions.

“It’s time for the elected representatives of the American people to have a say in the future of Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” said the Feb. 4 letter, first revealed by the Daily Beast and initiated by Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), a lead sponsor of the bill. “It’s time to vote.”

President Obama has said that he would veto any new sanctions, which he says could scuttle talks aimed at keeping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Democratic support for the new bill, introduced in December, has waned considerably.

A number of top Democrats, including several who originally sponsored the bill, now say they do not want it to advance while talks are underway.

A sizable portion of the Democratic caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives is also now opposed to new sanctions, although that body overwhelmingly approved a similar bill last summer, months before the new talks between Iran and the major powers, including the United States, were launched.

**The Senate bill has 59 co-sponsors, eight short of the 67 it would need to override an Obama veto.**

**Reid has so far resisted bringing the bill to the floor**. Proponents of the new sanctions say they would strengthen the West’s hand in Iran negotiations, adding that without new sanctions, the momentum in the talks is moving in Iran’s favor.

#### Sanctions push is decisively stalled, but that can still flip

David Weigel, Slate, 1/29/14, How Hubris (and J Street) Stalled the Iran Sanctions Bill, www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/01/29/how\_hubris\_and\_j\_street\_stalled\_the\_iran\_sanctions\_bill.html

This morning, after the State of the Union, Delaware Sen. Chris Coons sat down for a live interview with Politico's Manu Raju. Coons, who's facing re-election this year but lacks a serious opponent, had been an early co-sponsor of the new Iran sanctions bill. His support, added to that of other progressives up for re-election, had created a sense of momentum from sanctions backers. So Raju asked him about it. RAJU: You co-sponsored this Iran sanctions bill. Do you think this needs a vote before the negotiation period ends? COONS: Now is not the time for a vote on the Iran Sanctions Bill. I think that sanctions have so far been bearing fruit. Sanctions have brought Iran to the table and the sanctions that were passed by Congress during the Bush administration, during the Obama administration -- this administration has finally delivered on bringing together a multinational coalition of our allies and our partners to make those sanctions work, to really cripple the Iranian economy and bring them to the table. Coons wasn't the first co-sponsor to suggest that the train be slowed down, but he was the first of the 26 original co-sponsors to be this explicit. This wasn't where supporters of the bill, chiefly New Jersey Sen. Bob Menendez and Illinois Sen. Mark Kirk, expected to be at the end of the month. **Nineteen days ago, "aides**" told CNN and BuzzFeed that the bill **had broken a two-thirds majority, strong enough to beat a presidential veto**. **They'd come a long way, from apparent collapse to an apparent majority. But the bill is now,** in one of Washington's more universal bits of jargon, **stalled**. **How'd that happen**? A combination of hubris from the bill's supporters and lobbying by its opponents**.** When the bill dropped, on Dec. 19, J Street's director of government relations, Dylan Williams, was headed home (to Hawaii) for vacation. Over the holidays and until the Senate returned for 2014, the bill gained 21 additional co-sponsors. "Jan. 6 was when the counter-push began," said Williams. "Since that morning J Street has, along with other groups, played a very active, senators, members of Congress, but we made especially prodigious use of our grass tops activists. These are people who have longstanding relationships with members of Congress to express two things. One: The bill is bad policy. Two: There was no political reason that these senators should feel they need to support the bill. There is deep political support in communities for members of Congress and senators who want to reserve this peaceably. The extent of that grass-tops push really surprised a lot of senators and some members of Congress." J Street and company reached out to senators who were on the fence and senators who'd co-sponsored on day one. The message was the same: Have you guys read this thing? "It became quite clear that original sponsors had been told sanctions only would only come into effect if Iran was determined not to be negotiating in good faith," said Williams. "They learned that was untrue. The bill would implement sanctions 90 days after passage unless president could certify a a laundry list of claims, and some he couldn't certify if he tried." This brings us to the second cause of the impasse: hubris. The Jan. 10 news that the bill was unbeatable was based not on the public count of co-sponsors but on the low number of senators who'd denounced. A good example of this theory: A Jan. 10 (hey, busy day) piece by Adam Kredo that quoted an aide to Rand Paul who said the Kentucky libertarian would "keep an open mind." The scooplet was used to portray Arizona Sen. Jeff Flake as "the lone Republican who has publicly refused to take a stand on the bill." The pressure didn't work; the fightback was on. Both Flake and Paul maintained neutrality, as more Democrats were quoted opposing the sanctions bill, if only for reasons of timing, wanting to let negotiations play out. Democrats like Coons and New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker were pressured from the left on social media. There still aren't 34 confirmed "no" votes on the legislation, but the campaign to make Harry Reid hold a vote on a winning resolution is over. For the moment.

#### Democratic support for sanctions has slipped away for now

JTA, staff writer, 2/4/13, Dozens of House Dems sign letter to Obama opposing sanctions, www.jta.org/2014/02/04/news-opinion/politics/over-70-house-dems-sign-letter-to-obama-opposing-sanctions

More than 70 Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives signed a letter to President Obama supporting his opposition to new Iran sanctions. The letter, initiated by Reps. Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas) and David Price (D-N.C.), expresses support for the talks now underway between Iran and major powers on the Iranian nuclear program. “We understand that there is no assurance of success and that, if talks break down or Iran reneges on pledges it made in the interim agreement, Congress may be compelled to act as it has in the past by enacting additional sanctions legislation,” says the letter, which has not yet been sent and which JTA obtained Tuesday from Doggett’s office. “At present, however, we believe that Congress must give diplomacy a chance,” says the letter, first reported by The Washington Post on Monday. “A bill or resolution that risks fracturing our international coalition or, worse yet, undermining our credibility in future negotiations and jeopardizing hard-won progress toward a verifiable final agreement, must be avoided.” Signatories were not made available, although Doggett’s office and others circulating the petition said they numbered more than 70. Sources said they include Jewish lawmakers with strong pro-Israel records. Obama has said he would veto legislation under consideration in the Senate that would impose new sanctions on Iran, arguing that the agreement that led to renewed talks bans new sanctions and that such a bill could collapse the international coalition that helped bring Iran to the talks table. Proponents of the new sanctions, among them the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, say they would strengthen the U.S. hand at the talks. The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a companion bill last summer, before talks started, but it is not clear today whether it would have the same support among Democrats. “As a member of Congress who has consistently voted to impose tough economic sanctions on Iran, I believe those sanctions have worked,” Doggett said in a statement. “In honoring our commitment to Israel, we must use all of America’s strengths, including the strength of our diplomacy, to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-armed,” he said. “Congress should not undermine diplomacy by giving the Iranian hardliners an excuse to scuttle the negotiations.” **The new sanctions bill garnered** some **Democratic support** in the Senate **when it was introduced** in December, **but it has slipped away** since Congress returned from its holiday break.

#### **Plan’s controversial – sparks debate about piecemeal reform**

Light 10 (Claire, The former program manager (and a current board member) of Asian American arts organization, "Openish Thread: Should Immigration Reform Focus on the Highly Skilled?" April 26, 2010 <http://www.hyphenmagazine.com/blog/2010/04/openish-thread-should-immigration-reform-focus-highly-skilled>, JS)

The article goes on to say that some Dems are drafting legislation to address this problem by offering green cards to business and tech graduates or giving visas to entrepreneurs who can prove that they've attracted investors before they arrive in the country. But the approach is piecemeal and no one is sure if such an approach would work. And few lawmakers are eager to take on comprehensive immigration reform since the healthcare reform near-fiasco. Their political capital is spent.

#### **Plan draws fire from anti-immigrant coalitions**

Schonfeld 10 (Erick. "The Startup Visa: Create Jobs, Get A Green Card" 24 february. [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022404195.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022404195.html), JS)

A bill introduced today in the Senate by Democrat John Kerry and Republican Richard Lugar proposes a new type of visa for immigrants who create startups and jobs in the U.S. A similar proposal is part of an immigration reform bill in the House. The Startup Visa has been controversial and will no doubt draw fire from anti-immigrant forces and xenophobes.

#### Visa expansion is controversial – two reasons

Wadhwa 9 (Vivek, Senior Research Associate at Harvard Law. "The Startup Visa And Why The Xenophobes Need To Go Back Into Their Caves" 5 December. <http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/05/the-startup-visa-and-why-the-xenophobes-need-to-go-back-into-their-caves/>, JS)

But, no, logic doesn’t prevail with this crowd. I got the same stream of hate mail that I’m used to, and the xenophobes hijacked the BusinessWeek reader feedback section again. Most of their statements are illogical and uneducated. But there are two potentially meaningful arguments which opponents of the startup visa make, which are worth discussing: that the founders we are bringing in aren’t always the “best and brightest” and that there is already a visa category for geniuses called the O-1 visa.

#### Employment based visas are massively controversial

Tienda 10 (Princeton Demographic Studies Professor, 2010, Marta, “Employment-Based Immigration: Creating A Flexible and Simple System”, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, February, Pg. 4) wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports\_f09/591d\_2010.pdf 9-2

Employment-based immigration accounts for only seventeen percent of all legal immigration into the United States, yet it is one of the most controversial components of immigration policy. This report focuses solely on employment visas, and its recommendations should therefore not be misconstrued as applicable to other elements of the immigration system, such as family reunification visas.

Labor is lobbying against EB visa expansion – plan would split the base

Hastings 9 (Maribel. America's Voice, "Businesses and Unions Face the Guest-Worker Dilemma" 11 Dec. news.newamericamedia.org/news/view\_article.html?article\_id=c003ee8bfa648925642a1a4017e11f86, JS)

Given that splits within the labor movement in 2007 were one of the many reasons for the defeat of immigration reform in the Senate, the announcement was welcomed by diverse sectors of the pro-immigrant movement. The AFL-CIO represents 56 trade unions, with more than 10 million workers, and CTW is a coalition of 7 unions, with more than 6 million workers. Of course, the final chapter hasn’t yet been written in the saga between labor and business—frequent opponents who each wield enormous influence over the White House, Congress and the immigration debate. The consequences of defeat Business owners are being watched more closely than ever by immigration authorities to ensure they comply with laws that prohibit hiring undocumented workers. In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) audited more than 2,000 companies suspected of having undocumented employees on their payrolls—4 times the number audited in 2008. ICE fined companies a total of $2.5 million in 2008; in 2009, that amount skyrocketed to $16 million. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in August that during the first seven months of 2009, it had deported 215,000 undocumented immigrants. Last week, Human Rights Watch released the report “Locked Up Far Away,” in which it reported that 53 percent of the 1.4 million transfers of undocumented detainees to jails far from their original location had occurred since 2006. Unions have watched the deportation of members and potential members attempting to exercise their right to organize, as happened at the Smithfield processing plant in North Carolina. The sticking point In contrast to the demands of labor, business organizations demand an expansion of policies like the H-1, L-1 and EB visa programs, which facilitate the admission of professionals, employees with exceptional qualifications and investors. The United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC) places these demands on its website, along with a promise to “lobby for reform to enable seasonal and small businesses to continue to use the H-2B temporary visa.” The business sector favors legalizing the undocumented, but opposes the commission proposed by labor groups, instead defending a guest-worker program. David Ferreira, vice president of government affairs for the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), assured America’s Voice that “the commission is a non-starter. We know that the Administration considers it so, we know that the Congressional leadership privately considers it so". “Politically, it doesn’t have enough support for reform to go forward in the Senate and moderate Senators, Republicans and Democrats, don’t support the commission.” The USHCC and other business groups back “a regulator determined by the market to control the flow of immigrants, something that shouldn't be dictated by a political posse. It should be dictated by the needs of the economy", said Ferreira. Although the unemployment rate is now in double digits, a guest-worker plan is needed, according to Ferreira, because “our economy isn't going to be down forever. Our economy is going to grow, and at that point businesses are going to demand workers.” “We have concerns that some members of the labor movement are not fully committed to comprehensive immigration reform, and the commission is one additional means by which they want to restrict the ability of immigrants to lawfully enter the United States", Ferreira indicated. But Ana Avendaño, the AFL-CIO's assistant to the President for Immigration and Community Action, told America’s Voice: “How can (the USHCC) explain to a member of Congress that they support bringing hundreds of thousands of temporary workers into the country when we have 16 million people out of work? The politician who accepts that will find himself out of work after the next election!”

AFL-CIO wants to eliminate EB visas

National foundation for American policy 9 (may, <http://www.nfap.com/pdf/0905commission.pdf>, JS)

In April 2009, the AFL-CIO and Change to Win announced “The Labor Movement’s Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.” This announcement was viewed as part of a political compromise – the AFL-CIO would agree not to oppose legalization for up to 12 million illegal immigrants in the United States if it achieved one of the union’s long-standing objectives – virtually eliminating employment-based immigration into the United States.

#### **Guest worker programs are massively unpopular and draw tons of ire**

Lawrence 10 (Stewart, Counter Punch, “The Prospects for Comprehensive Immigration Reform” iViews Online, <http://www.iviews.com/articles/articles.asp?ref=CP1001-4055&p=2>)

Because the mid-term elections are fast approaching, and many House Democrats, especially freshmen, are still fearful of a public backlash on immigration, the White House also needs to shoot for a bi-partisan super-majority in the Senate Ð something on the order of 65-35 or even 70-30 - to trigger massive support in the lower chamber also.   One key difference in this year's debate is that immigration proponents, in deference to organized labor, have dropped the idea of instituting a massive "guest worker" program intended, at least ostensibly, to fill economy-wide labor shortages that might occur if tightened immigration enforcement succeeds in "drying up" illegal labor.  GOP conservatives tend to view guest workers as a stalking horse and catalyst for illegal migration or as a backdoor path to permanent migration.  In fact, liberal-conservative wrangling over a proposed guest worker program helped defeat comprehensive immigration reform in 2007.   On balance, eliminating the guest worker issue probably improves the chances that a new White House bill will pass, Senate sources say.

#### Wins don’t spillover---capital is finite---prioritizing issues is key

Schultz 13 David Schultz is a professor at Hamline University School of Business, where he teaches classes on privatization and public, private and nonprofit partnerships. He is the editor of the Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE). “Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term,” MinnPost, 1/22, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited. Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president. Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts. Presidents lose political capital, support But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces. Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.

#### Obama PC still key – will have to negotiate with Congress after diplomatic talks

**NIAC 2/10** [http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=10371]

Washington, DC - “If the President is able to negotiate an agreement with Iran, he would need to come back to the Congress because some of those sanctions can’t be lifted without Congress agreeing,” said Nicholas Burns, a career diplomat who served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs during the Bush Administration. ¶ Speaking at a Capitol Hill briefing sponsored by Partnership for a Secure America, Burns stressed that the Constitution gives the President a great deal of authority to decide and execute foreign policy, but urged that the White House and Congress work together towards a final nuclear deal. “We would want to see . . . an integration between the Executive and Legislative branches on this very important issue. This is not a trivial matter.”

#### The plan’s hit to Obama’s standing ensures Democratic defections

Josh Kraushaar, National Journal, 11/22/13, The Iran Deal Puts Pro-Israel Democrats in a Bind, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-iran-deal-puts-pro-israel-democrats-in-a-bind-20131122

All of this puts Democrats, who routinely win overwhelming support from Jewish Americans on Election Day, in an awkward position. Do they stand with the president on politically sensitive foreign policy issues, or stake their own course? That difficult dynamic is currently playing out in Congress, where the Obama administration is resisting a Senate push to maintain tough sanctions against Iran. This week, Obama met with leading senators on the Banking and Foreign Relations committees to dissuade them from their efforts while diplomacy is underway.

"There's a fundamental disagreement between the vast majority of Congress and the president when it comes to increasing Iran sanctions right now," said one Democratic operative involved in the advocacy efforts. "Pro-Israel groups, like AIPAC, try to do things in a bipartisan way; they don't like open confrontation. But in this instance, it's hard."

That awkwardness has been evident in the lukewarm reaction from many of Obama's Senate Democratic allies to the administration's outreach to Iran. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez of New Jersey said last week he was concerned that the administration seems "to want the deal almost more than the Iranians." Normally outspoken Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, a reliable ally of Israel, has been conspicuously quiet about his views on the negotiations. In a CNN interview this month, Democratic Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, whose job as chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee is to defend the president, notably declined to endorse the administration's approach, focusing instead on Obama's past support of sanctions. This, despite the full-court press from Secretary of State John Kerry, a former congressional colleague.

On Tuesday, after meeting with Obama, Menendez and Schumer signed a bipartisan letter to Kerry warning the administration about accepting a deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear program. The letter was also signed by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Robert Casey, D-Pa.

Democrats, of course, realize that the president plays an outsized role in the policy direction of his party. Just as George W. Bush moved the Republican Party in a more hawkish direction during his war-riven presidency, Obama is nudging Democrats away from their traditionally instinctive support for the Jewish state. "I can't remember the last time the differences [between the U.S. and Israel] were this stark," said one former Democratic White House official with ties to the Jewish community. "There's now a little more freedom [for progressive Democrats] to say what they want to say, without fear of getting their tuchus kicked by the organized Jewish community."

A Gallup survey conducted this year showed 55 percent of Democrats sympathizing with the Israelis over the Palestinians, compared with 78 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of independents who do so. A landmark Pew poll of American Jews, released in October, showed that 35 percent of Jewish Democrats said they had little or no attachment to Israel, more than double the 15 percent of Jewish Republicans who answered similarly. At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, many delegates booed a platform proposal supporting the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2011, Democrats lost Anthony Weiner's heavily Jewish, solidly Democratic Brooklyn House seat because enough Jewish voters wanted to rebuke the president's perceived hostility toward Israel.

Pro-Israel advocacy groups rely on the mantra that support for Israel carries overwhelming bipartisan support, a maxim that has held true for decades in Congress. But most also reluctantly acknowledge the growing influence of a faction within the Democratic Party that is more critical of the two countries' close relationship. Within the Jewish community, that faction is represented by J Street, which positions itself as the home for "pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans" and supports the Iran negotiations. "Organizations that claim to represent the American Jewish community are undermining [Obama's] approach by pushing for new and harsher penalties against Iran," the group wrote in an action alert to its members.

Some supporters of Israel view J Street with concern. "There's a small cadre of people that comes from the progressive side of the party that are in the business of blaming Israel first. There's a chorus of these guys," said a former Clinton administration foreign policy official. "But that doesn't make them the dominant folks in the policy space of the party, or the Hill."

Pro-Israel activists worry that one of the ironies of Obama's situation is that as his poll numbers sink, his interest in striking a deal with Iran will grow because he'll be looking for any bit of positive news that can draw attention away from the health care law's problems. Thus far, Obama's diminished political fortunes aren't deterring Democrats from protecting the administration's prerogatives. Congressional sources expect the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by South Dakota Democrat Tim Johnson, to hold off on any sanctions legislation until there's a resolution to the Iranian negotiations.

**But if Obama's standing continues to drop**, and if Israel doesn't like the deal, **don't be surprised to see Democrats become less hesitant about going their own way**.

#### Capital key

Peter Nicholas, WSJ, 1/21/14, The Missing Pieces in Obama’s Bully Pulpit, blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/01/21/the-missing-pieces-in-obamas-bully-pulpit/

Mr. Obama has never been one for strong-arm tactics: intimidating opponents or striking fear into lawmakers who’ve crossed him.  It’s not part of his emotional wiring.

Nor has he put much stock in seducing lawmakers in the manner, say, of a Lyndon Johnson.

**He prefers making a reasonable argument** that resonates with the broader public, pressuring Congress to fall in line.

Mr. Obama got a huge laugh at the [White House Correspondence Association dinner](http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/04/28/transcript-of-obamas-remarks-at-white-house-correspondents-dinner/) last year when he said: “Some folks still don’t think I spend enough time with Congress. ‘Why don’t you get a drink with [Senate Republican leader] [Mitch McConnell](http://topics.wsj.com/person/M/mitch-mcconnell/7788?lc=int_mb_1001)?’ they ask. Really? Why don’t you get a drink with Mitch McConnell?”

Robert Gates, the former defense secretary who served under both George W. Bush and Mr. Obama has just come out with a memoir describing his time in office. Meeting with reporters over breakfast last week, Mr. Gates said of Messrs. Bush and Obama: “They were neither much liked nor much feared on the Hill.”

With three years left in his presidency, White House advisers say Mr. Obama is charting a course that ensures his agenda won’t be hostage to a polarized Congress. He’ll make more use of his executive authority to curb global warming and boost the economy.

Yet the president won’t be able to bypass his legislative adversaries altogether. **He needs to fend off a push by some in Congress to impose new sanctions on Iran, a move that could complicate his efforts to thwart Iran’s nuclear program through diplomatic means**. He wants to pass an immigration bill, a promise left over from his 2008 campaign.

#### Obama’s standing with Dems is critical

David Rhode, The Atlantic, 1/15/14, Democrats Could Wreck Obama's Biggest Foreign-Policy Success, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/democrats-could-wreck-obamas-biggest-foreign-policy-success/283103/

By design or accident, it is increasingly clear that the centerpiece of President Barack Obama’s second-term foreign policy is a nuclear agreement with Iran. Whether Obama can succeed, however, now depends on Congress staying out of the negotiations.

Over the last few weeks, 16 Democratic senators have supported a bill that would impose new sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. They have defied the White House’s intense campaign to block Congress from adding new conditions to any deal.

In this way, Obama is the victim of an increasingly craven Washington—where members of his own party are abandoning him out of political expedience. At the same time, the White House is also a victim of its sometimes erratic responses to events in the Middle East.

For the last six years, the president has repeatedly declared that he does not want the United States entangled in another conflict in the Middle East. As a result, allies and enemies at home and abroad, from members of Congress to Israeli and Iranian hawks, question his commitment to use force against Iran if negotiations fail.

Experts warn that the stakes are enormous. Political opportunism, maximalist positions, and mixed messages could take on a life of their own, scuttle the talks, and inadvertently spark military action.

George Perkovich, director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, lambasted the bill’s congressional sponsors in Foreign Affairs. He accused the Democratic senators Robert Menendez and Charles Schumer, and the Republican senator Mark Kirk, of reckless grandstanding. “The Menendez-Kirk-Schumer bill may be politically expedient,” Perkovich wrote, “but it is also entirely unnecessary and dangerous.”

Much of the Democrats’ maneuvering is old-fashioned political posturing. All the Democratic officeholders now supporting the sanctions bill, David Weigel noted in Slate Tuesday, face tough re-election battles. Rejecting calls from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to support the new sanctions bill could make them vulnerable to attacks of capitulating to Iran. So far, Democrats from “safer, bluer” turf—including Senators Tim Kaine and Chris Murphy—are not supporting the bill.

Ambition also plays a role here. Schumer, who is safe in New York, is looking to succeed Senator Harry Reid as majority leader. His chief rival for this job, Senator Dick Durbin, who was the senior senator from Illinois when Obama was the junior senator, is backing the administration.

Democrats who support the new sanctions bill claim that their goal is to give Obama greater leverage in talks with Tehran. But Perkovich and other experts warn that the proposed sanctions threaten to spark a tit-for-tat cycle of escalation.

As American hard-liners saber rattle, Iranian hard-liners are saber rattling back. If Congress does pass the new sanctions bill, a senior member of the Iranian parliament has threatened, his nation would respond by beginning to enrich uranium to 60 percent—a level close to that needed for a nuclear bomb.

The major unresolved issue—and the biggest threat to a comprehensive deal—is whether Iran should be allowed any enrichment capability. The White House has signaled that it would accept a tightly monitored program in Iran—one that enriches uranium only to the level used for energy and research. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and hawkish members of Congress argue that increased sanctions will force the regime to give up enrichment or collapse.

Reza Marashi, research director of the National Iranian American Council, an advocacy group that supports the nuclear talks, said it is political suicide for any Iranian official to accept no enrichment. Tehran’s hard-liners would accuse them of capitulation to the United States and Israel.

“I don’t know any Iran analyst—except for those on the far, far right,” Marashi told me in a telephone interview Tuesday, “who think that zero enrichment is possible.”

Obama has also made foreign policy missteps. As I wrote last week, the administration’s shifting positions on Syria—from demanding President Bashar al-Assad “must go” to declaring “red lines” on chemical weapons use and then backing away from military action—has hurt his credibility in the region.

Perkovich said **domestic missteps have played a role** as well. The interim agreement with Iran was announced just as the Obamacare website began its botched rollout. **Congressional Democrats facing tough re-election battles decided they simply could not trust the White House**. “The timing was disastrous [to Congress],” Perkovich told me in a telephone interview Tuesday. “They thought ‘these guys are totally incompetent.’”

In addition, the president’s disinterest—or inability—to develop close relationships with members of Congress is now coming back to haunt him. As former Defense Secretary Bob Gates noted in his new memoir, Duty, Obama and President George W. Bush each loathed dealing with Congress. “Both, I believe, detested Congress,” Gates writes, “and resented having to deal with it, including members of their own party.”

Perkovich argues that Congress should allow negotiations to succeed or fail. A deal that blocks Iran from obtaining a weapon would bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in place since the 1970s, and reduce tensions in the Middle East. A collapse in the talks would weaken the non-proliferation regime and even spark a U.S.-Israeli military strike on Iran.

More decisive leadership from Obama and less opportunism from Democratic senators will not magically stabilize the Middle East. **But there is no need for Democratic senators to add to the chaos for political gain**.

#### Reid key

Carney 2/6/14

Jordain, national journal, “Robert Menendez Seeks Distance From GOP on Iran Sanctions,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/robert-menendez-seeks-distance-from-gop-on-iran-sanctions-20140206>

Forty-two Republicans sent a letter to Sen. Harry Reid on Tuesday calling for a vote during the current work period on Menendez's proposal. That would require a vote on the bill next week, with the Senate expected to start its next state-work period on Feb. 17. In the letter, uploaded by The Daily Beast's Josh Rogin, Republicans say it is the Obama administration that is turning a historically bipartisan issue into a partisan one, and hits at Reid for taking "unprecedented steps to take away the rights of the minority in the Senate." Republicans have continued to speak out against Reid's decision to "go nuclear" last year, and the two sides have frequently gotten bogged down in fights over amendments to legislation. The sanctions bill has 58 cosponsors, 15 of whom are Democrats and 43 are Republican. Of the 15 Democratic cosponors, two signed on after Dec. 19—the day the bill was introduced. Under the interim agreement reached by six countries with Iran in November, the country curbs its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. Menendez said he remains deeply concerned about Iran, noting that officials "say one thing behind closed doors in Geneva, and say another thing publically." And he called the one-year sanctions delay included in his proposal "significant and generous given Iran's history of treachery and deceit." But whether or not sanctions legislation will come up for a vote in the Senate **rests with one person**—Reid, who has frequently avoided being pinned down on if, and when, he would bring such a proposal to the floor. The Nevada Democrat said last month that he would "wait and see" about legislation.

#### Political capital is key to Reid

Kaper 1/16/14

Stacy, National Journal, “Iran Hawks Flounder Against Reid-Obama Coalition,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/iran-hawks-flounder-against-reid-obama-coalition-20140116

Senate Iran hawks have lots of votes to back their sanctions legislation. What they lack is a plan to get the bill to the floor. Fifty-nine senators—including 16 Democrats—have signed onto sanctions legislation from Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez and Republican Sen. Mark Kirk. The measure would punish Iran with sanctions if it reneges on an interim nuclear agreement or if that agreement does not ultimately abolish any nuclear-weapons capabilities for Iran. That count has climbed rapidly since the bipartisan pair introduced their legislation in late December. But now it's unclear whether that support will be enough to clear the bill's next major hurdle: Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Reid is siding with the White House, **which has put intense pressure on lawmakers not to act on sanctions**, arguing it could result in both a nuclear-armed and hostile Iranian state. And without Reid's backing, supporters of the Menendez-Kirk bill are unsure how to move the measure to the floor. "I assume that if the Democrat senators put enough pressure on Senator Reid he might bring it to the floor," said Missouri Republican Sen. Roy Blunt. "But, you know, we are at a moment in the Senate where nothing happens that Senator Reid doesn't want to happen; and this is something at this moment that Senator Reid doesn't want to happen." And for now, sanctions supporters are still mulling their strategy. "We are talking amongst ourselves. There is a very active debate and discussion ongoing about how best to move forward," said Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a cosponsor of the bill. "There are a number of alternative strategies, but we're deliberating them." While Reid has, at least for now, foiled their policy plans, sanctions supporters are still scoring the desired political points on the issue. They can report their efforts to their constituents while blaming Reid for the inaction. But whatever pressure Reid is getting from his colleagues, **he's also getting support from the commander in chief.** In a White House meeting Wednesday night, President Obama made a hard sell to Democrats on the issue, pleading with them to back off sanctions while his team worked on a nuclear pact. "The president did speak passionately about how [we] must seize this opportunity, that we need to seize this six months … and that if Iran isn't willing to in the end make the decisions necessary to make it work, he'll be ready to sign a bill to tighten those sanctions—but we gotta give this six months," said Sen. Jeff Merkley of Oregon, after returning from the White House. In the meantime, many bill supporters reason that Reid will eventually feel the heat. "We'll just have to ratchet up the pressure, that's all," said Republican Sen. John McCain. "**The president is pushing back,** obviously, and he's appealing to the **loyalty of Democrats**, but there are a lot of other forces out there that are pushing in the other direction, so we'll see how they react."